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Abstract: The recent debates about what constitutes scientific research in Education, on the one 
hand, and the so-called “paradigm wars” that got played out in the final quarter of the 20th century, 
on the other, are more similar than different. At the center of both controversies was the relative 
worth of quantitative and qualitative research methods. Both controversies also distracted 
researchers’ from addressing the substantive problems that plague schools and other educational 
organizations. This paper attempts to move the field beyond the debates of the past and similar 
debates that seem likely to occur in the future. Inspired, in large part, by Joseph Schwab’s largely 
unheeded critique of the curriculum field in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the paper attempts to re-
conceptualize what inquiry in a field like Education should look like, as well as the role that 
quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods research could play in a re-conceptualized approach to 
inquiry.  
Keywords: educational research; qualitative methods; Science Wars. 
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¿Qué pasaría si la investigación educativa no fueran ni Ciencias Sociales ni tampoco un 
campo de las Humanidades? Revisitando Joseph Schwab , “The Practical” después  de la 
guerra de las ciencias. 
Resumen: Los recientes debates sobre lo que constituye la investigación científica en educación, por 
una parte, y los que acompañaron las llamadas " guerras de paradigmas" de los últimos 25 años del 
siglo 20, por el otro, son más similares que diferentes. En el centro de ambas controversias fue el 
valor relativo de los métodos de investigación cuantitativos y cualitativos. Ambas controversias 
distrajeron la atención de los investigadores para abordar los problemas de fondo que plagan 
escuelas y otros centros docentes. Este artículo trata de mover el campo más allá de los debates del 
pasado y debates similares que pareciera van a seguir ocurriendo. Inspirado, en gran parte, por la 
crítica (en gran medida ignorada) que Joseph Schwab realizó sobre el campo curricular a principios 
de la década de 1960 y a finales de 1970, este trabajo trata de volver a conceptualizar lo que la 
investigación en un campo como la educación debería  ser, así como el papel que la investigación 
cuantitativa, cualitativos y de métodos mixtos podrían jugar en un enfoque re- conceptualizado de la 
investigación. 
Palabras clave: investigación educativa; métodos cualitativos; guerra de las ciencias. 
 
E se pesquisa educacional não eram nem ciências sociais, nem um campo das 
humanidades? Revisitando Joseph Schwab, “A Prática”  após a guerra das ciências. 
Resumo: Os recentes debates sobre o que constitui a pesquisa científica na educação, por um lado , 
e aqueles que acompanharam as "guerras paradigma" nos últimos 25 anos do século 20, por outro 
lado, são mais semelhantes do que diferentes. No cerne de ambas as disputas foi o valor relativo de 
métodos de pesquisa quantitativa e qualitativa. Ambas as controvérsias distraíram a atenção dos 
pesquisadores para resolver os problemas subjacentes que afligem as escolas e outras organizações 
educacionais. Este artigo tenta mover o campo para além dos debates do passado e que parece 
debates semelhantes continuarão acontecendo. Inspirado em grande parte, pela revisão (em grande 
parte ignorado) Joseph Schwab realizado em campo do currículo no início de 1960 e final de 1970 , 
este artigo tenta re-conceituar o que a pesquisa em um campo tão a educação deveria ser, e o papel 
que os métodos de pesquisa quantitativos, qualitativos e mistos poderiam jogar em uma perspectiva  
de investigação re-conceituada. 
Palavras-chave: pesquisa educacional, os métodos qualitativos, guerras de ciência. 
Introduction 
What should be strikingly obvious to anyone who reflects on both the recent battles over 
what constitutes “scientific research in education” (National Research Council, 2002), the “paradigm 
wars” (Gage, 1989) about qualitative methods, and so-called positivist epistemology that were fought 
during the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Lincoln & Guba, 1985) is the amount of time and energy members 
of the educational research community spend engaging in internal methodological and 
epistemological debates. To be sure, these debates have had important consequences for members 
of the educational research community. The “paradigm wars,” for example, helped legitimate the use 
of a wide variety of qualitative methods as well as the researchers who employed such methods. 
Conversely, the more recent debates about what constitutes scientific research in education 
(National Research Council, 2002) have had the effect of minimizing the use of qualitative 
methodology and narrowing researchers’ methodological options, at least if researchers want to get 
their projects funded by the federal government and, also, increasingly, by private foundations. 
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Indeed, government request for proposals (RFPs) now normally display a clear preference for 
experimental or quasi-experimental quantitative designs and relegate qualitative studies to a 
decidedly supporting role (e.g. Institute of Education Sciences, 2006). Even research and evaluation 
oriented foundations (e.g. Social Impact Exchange, 2012) often prefer the sort of randomized-trial 
designs that science-war combatant Grover Whitehurst (2003) championed as the new gold standard 
for educational inquiry. 
Never-ending debates about research methods and theories of knowledge, however, also can 
be a distraction. I know a number of educational researchers, for example, who have built their 
careers almost exclusively around writing about research methods and the philosophical assumptions 
that support their use rather than actually using their touted research methods to study substantive 
concerns. As I think about what can feel like a never-ending (and seemingly unresolvable) debate 
about research methods and epistemological issues—a debate in which I often have been a willing 
participant (see, for example, Donmoyer, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2006)—I cannot help but think of what 
Joseph Schwab once wrote about the Curriculum Studies subfield within the larger field of 
Education.  
In 1969 Schwab declared the Curriculum Studies field “moribund” and cited as evidence to 
support his claim “signs [that] consist of a large increase in the frequency of published papers and 
colloquia marked by a flight from the subject of the field” (p. 3, emphasis in the original). “The first and 
most important, though often least conspicuous, sign,” according to Schwab,  
is a flight of the field itself, a translocation of its problems and the solving of them 
from the nominal practitioners of the field to other men [and women]….A second 
flight is a flight upward, from discourse about the subject of the field to discourse 
about the discourse of the field, from use of principles and methods to talk about 
them. (p. 4) 
Schwab also mentioned another indicator of flight from a field that is moribund: “a marked increase 
in eristic, contentious, and ad hominem debate” (p. 4).  
I wonder: Do our re-occurring debates about methodology and the epistemological 
assumptions that support different methodological orientations—debates that frequently are quite 
“eristic, contentious, and ad hominem”—signal something similar to the “flight from the problems 
of the field” that Schwab observed in Curriculum Studies in 1969? Consequently, before we end up 
engaging in yet another version of the paradigm/science wars of the past, I want, in this paper, to 
step back and reconsider the basic frames both quantitative and qualitative (and, also, mixed-
methods) researchers have been using to conceptualize the educational inquiry enterprise. In the 
process of doing this, the paper also will begin to conceptualize a quite different vision of what 
inquiry in a field like education might look like, a conceptualization that places deliberation about 
specific policy and practice decisions at the center of the inquiry process and recasts traditional 
qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods research in an important but, nonetheless, supporting 
role.  
Everything Old is New Again (Sort Of) 
20th and 21st Century Battles Over Research Methods 
At first glance, the 21st century science wars appear to be little more than reenactments of 
the so-called paradigm wars (Gage, 1989) that occurred in the educational research field during the 
1970s and 80s. After all, both sets of skirmishes centered, to a large extent, on the relative virtues of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods.  
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Those who started the paradigm wars, for instance, were fighting to legitimate the use of 
qualitative methods in the field of educational research. Some, like Miles and Huberman (1994), 
made the case for using qualitative methods on pragmatic grounds; others, like Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), embedded their methodological arguments in claims about the emergence of a new research 
paradigm that was built around a new and different epistemology. At the operational level, however, 
both sets of combatants focused on research methods, both claimed that traditional quantitative 
methods could not really tell policymakers and practitioners “what works” as quantitative 
researchers since Thorndike (1910) had assumed, and both argued that qualitative methods were 
required either as a supplement to (Miles & Hubberman, 1994) or an alternative for (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985) traditional quantitative research designs.  
Neither the insurgent qualitative researchers nor traditional quantitative researchers 
completely won the paradigm wars. Eventually, members of the field opted to embrace a version of 
“big-tent politics” (Donmoyer, 1999) and create space in the field for people with a wide variety of 
methodological proclivities. The ceasefire more-or-less ended in the first decade of the 21st century, 
however, with the advent of the so-called science wars. Once again, the battle lines were drawn 
between qualitative and quantitative researchers.  
In an invited address at the 2003 American Educational Research Association’s (AERA) 
Annual Meeting, for example, Grover Whitehurst (2003), the newly appointed head of the newly 
created Institute of Education Sciences (IES), the federal agency charged with distributing funds to 
support educational research, proclaimed that quantitative experimental studies that randomly 
assigned research subjects to experimental and control groups were the new gold standard in 
educational inquiry. A year earlier, the National Research Council (2002) published Scientific Research 
in Education. That book, which was the work of a committee composed primarily of well-established 
members of the educational research field, made a more nuanced case for the relative superiority of 
quantitative methods.  
Among other things, the authors of Scientific Research in Education acknowledged that, for a 
variety of reasons, it is not always feasible or prudent to implement the sort of randomized trial 
designs that were the federal government’s new gold standard in educational inquiry. They also 
argued, however, that the invariant goal of “scientific research in education” is the creation of 
generalizable theory, and they suggested that theory (rather than the findings of any particular study 
or collection of studies) would be able to tell policymakers and practitioners “what works.” 
Despite the caveats and qualifications, the methodological bottom line for those who led the 
scientific-research-in-education initiative for the National Research Council was not all that different 
than the bottom line articulated by Whitehurst (2003): “The bottom line is that experimentation has 
been shown to be feasible in education and related fields…and is still the single best methodological 
route to ferreting out systematic relations between actions and outcomes” (Feuer, Towne, & 
Shavelson, 2002b, p. 8).  
The authors of Scientific Research in Education did, in time, try to soften this bottom line a bit, 
especially in the two contributions the book’s editors and an National Research Council staffer co-
authored for a special issue of the Educational Researcher devoted to critiques of the book. In their lead 
article, for example, they acknowledged that “the rhetoric of scientifically based research in 
education seems to denigrate the legitimate role of qualitative methods in elucidating the 
complexities of teaching, learning, and schooling” (Feuer, Towne, & Shavelson, 2002b, p. 8). They, 
then, went on to articulate what they believed to be the appropriate role for qualitative research: 
When a problem is poorly understood and plausible hypotheses are scant—as is the 
case in many areas if education—qualitative methods such as ethnographies…and 
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other tools like design experiments…are necessary to describe complex phenomena, 
generate theoretical models, and reframe questions. (p. 8).  
Support for the use of qualitative methods also is a component of what appears to be an 
endorsement of mixed-methods research designs: “In keeping with our claim of the importance of 
attending to context in all scientific studies of education,” Feuer, Towne, and Shavelson (2002b) 
wrote, “we believe that understanding causal processes and mechanism require close attention to 
contextual factors and that capturing these complexities typically requires qualitative modes of 
inquiry” (p. 8).  
None of this was new, of course. Using qualitative methods for hypothesis and theory 
generation purposes was the sanctioned role for qualitative researchers to play prior to the paradigm 
wars. And, using qualitative methods to identify contextual factors that mitigate cause and effect 
generalizations and the theories that articulate them was endorsed by quantitative researchers during 
the earlier paradigm wars (see, for example, Cronbach, 1975; Gage, 1989). Such highly circumscribed 
endorsements of qualitative methods did not placate most qualitative research advocates during the 
paradigm wars of the past century, however, and they also did not dissuade qualitative researchers 
from criticizing Scientific Research in Education during the science wars that unfolded during the first 
decade of the 21st century.  
An Important Distinction or a Distinction Without a Difference? 
There was, however, at least one potentially significant difference between the skirmishes 
about methods that occurred in our field during the final three decades of the 20th century and 
those that played out in the field during the first decade of the 21st century: Those who made the 
21st century case for the relative superiority of quantitative methods and for a highly circumscribed 
role for qualitative research framed their comments as a discussion about the meaning of science 
rather than as a discussion about research methods per se. “Our attention to scientific educational 
research is not intended to exclude or minimize other forms of educational research and 
scholarship,” Feuer, Towne, and Shavelson (2002a, p. 29) wrote in their rejoinder to postmodern 
scholar Elizabeth St. Pierre’s (2002) critique of Scientific Research in Education. And, in their 
introductory essay for the special issue of Educational Researcher in which the St. Pierre critique 
appeared, Feuer, Towne, and Shavelson (2002b) articulated  
an important distinction between educational research generally and scientific 
educational research specifically. We focus on the latter. Though we assume 
unapologetically that scientific research is an endeavor that can uniquely contribute 
to greater understanding and improvement of education, we do not intend to 
minimize the significance of…nonscientific forms of study in education. (p. 8) 
Among other things, this new framing immunized those who employed it against charges of 
scientism (the ideology that assumes that science is the only valid source of knowledge). It also 
allowed those who employed it to endorse—or at least appear to endorse—the big-tent thinking that 
had actually ended the paradigm wars of the past: educational research that did not fit within the 
boundaries drawn by the authors of Scientific Research in Education was not necessarily bad research; it 
simply was not scientific research. The fact that AERA now has two sets of standards for reviewers 
of articles submitted to their journals for possible publication—one set for so-called scientific 
research and the other for non-scientific or what is referred to as humanities-based inquiry—is a 
testament to the impact of those who made the case for the relative superiority of quantitative over 
qualitative methods by reframing the methodological debate around the concept of science.  
Most qualitative researchers were not mollified by the new version of big-tent politics 
articulated by the authors of Scientific Research in Education, however. Science, after all, has always been 
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a contested concept. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973/2000), for example, explicitly stated that 
the goal of his thick description-oriented form of ethnography was not the generation of theory (the 
central goal of scientific research, according to the authors of Scientific Research in Education), yet he 
also labeled what he and other cultural anthropologists did science (Geertz, 1973/2000). 
Consequently, ethnographers and other qualitative researchers who used Geertz’s ethnographic 
methods had little reason to accept the quite different conception of science promoted by the 
authors of Scientific Research in Education rather than the conception of science articulated by a well-
regarded ethnographer.  
Similarly, qualitative researchers influenced by feminist scholarship had no reason to prefer 
the particular conception of science articulated in Scientific Research in Education over the very different 
conception of science articulated by, say, feminist philosopher of science, Sandra Harding (1991). 
And, then, there is Betty St. Pierre (2002, 2011) and the postmodernists. To be sure, postmodernists 
undoubtedly would be more than happy to cede the science label to the authors of Scientific Research 
in Education (or to anyone else, for that matter). But they also would challenge the books narrative 
about what scientific research can accomplish and, in fact, most would turn that narrative on its 
head by focusing on the political and power dimensions of science, dimensions that have little if 
anything to do with the empirical data scientific studies generate (Donmoyer, 2005).  
There are also more pragmatic reasons why some qualitative researchers have not accepted 
the Feuer, Towne, and Shavelson (2002a) distinction between “educational research generally and 
scientific educational research specifically” (p. 8) or the particular conception of science articulated 
in Scientific Research in Education (National Research Council, 2002). Scientific research is normally a 
synonym for fundable research. This is clearly the case with federal funding (Institute of Education 
Sciences, 2006; Whitehurst, 2002), but it is also increasingly the case for funding from private 
foundations (Social Impact Exchange, 2012) as well.  
Finally—and, for me, in the context of this paper, most importantly—there is another type 
of pragmatic reason for rejecting the storyline about scientific research in education articulated in the 
book published by the National Research Council: What the authors of Scientific Research in Education 
promise cannot be delivered; theory simply cannot tell policymakers or practitioners what will work 
in the particular contexts they hope to influence.   
The Matters of Contextual Variation and Individual Idiosyncrasy  
The authors of Scientific Research in Education are correct when they claim that policymakers 
and many practitioners want educational researchers to identify cause/effect relationships that will 
tell them “what works” and allow them to fund, implement, and scale-up only effective educational 
programs and strategies. The authors also are correct when they claim that experimental research 
(using randomized assignment to experimental and control groups, if possible) is, in principle, the best 
vehicle for generating such knowledge. The problem, however, is that ideas that are correct in 
principle are not necessarily viable when principles get played out in reality. In the real world, 
contextual complexity and the idiosyncratic nature of individuals inevitably come into play. The 
importance of context and the idiosyncratic nature of human beings, in fact, were front and center 
in the case for qualitative methods made during the paradigm wars of the last century (see, for 
example, Lincoln and Guba’s critique of the concept of causality in their 1985 book, Naturalistic 
Inquiry) and, also, in many critiques of Scientific Research in Education articulated in this century. (The 
inevitability of contextual and individual variation, for instance, is a foundational idea in the paper 
Fred Erickson has written for the special issue in which this paper appears.)  
The authors of Scientific Research in Education were not completely oblivious to the problems 
created by contextual and individual variation. In fact, they acknowledged the problem of contextual 
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variation and declared that the theories developed in education have to take contextual variation into 
account. Unfortunately, developing theories that adequately accommodate contextual variation and 
the idiosyncratic nature of individuals is easier said than done.  
Ironically, it is the person to whom the authors of Scientific Research in Education dedicated 
their book, Lee Cronbach, who, over the course of his career, demonstrated the problem with the 
authors’ solution to the contextual variation problem. In the 1950s, Cronbach (1957) was saying 
much the same thing about managing the contextual variation problem that the authors of Scientific 
Research in Education articulated in 2002. According to Cronbach, in the 1950s the field of educational 
psychology merely had to bring together what he referred to as “the two schools of scientific 
psychology”—i.e., the school that studied the effects of treatments on individuals and the school 
that documented personal characteristics and individual differences. Rather than asking about the 
effect of a treatment on people, in general, Cronbach argued, researchers needed to ask about the 
effect of a treatment on people with certain characteristics (or, to use Cronbach’s term, certain 
aptitudes).  
By the 1970s, however, after nearly two decades of trying to track down what Cronbach 
referred to as Aptitude X Treatment interaction (ATI) effects, he had revised his thinking: “An ATI 
result can be taken as a general conclusion, “ Cronbach wrote in 1975,  
only if it is not in turn moderated by further variables. If Aptitude X Treatment X 
Sex interact, for example, then the Aptitude X Treatment effect does not tell the 
story. Once we attend to interactions, we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to 
infinity. However far we carry our analysis—to third order or fifth order or any 
other—untested interactions of still higher order can be envisioned (p. 119).   
By the 1980s, Cronbach had moved even further away from the thinking he had articulated in the 
1950s (and, also, the thinking articulated in Scientific Research in Education about this matter). In a book 
chapter published in 1982, for example, Cronbach was sounding more like a constructivist 
qualitative researcher than his earlier professional self. Among other things, he now claimed that 
social action was constructed not caused. He also compared researchers and decision makers who 
expected research, in time, to produce definitive knowledge about cause and effect generalizations to 
the characters in the Beckett (2004) play “Waiting for Godot,” i.e., people who were waiting for 
something that never appeared.  
Elsewhere, I have suggested that constructivist qualitative researchers’ cavalier rejection of 
the concept of causality (see, for example, Lincoln & Guba, 1985) was problematic. Even if the 
notion of causality is a fiction, I argued, it is a highly functional fiction in social life (Donmoyer, 
2012); we would not, for example, be able to make social policy of any sort without at least positing 
the existence of cause and effect relationships. But claiming that the concept of causality is 
functional is not the same thing as claiming that scientific educational researchers will be able to 
develop theories about cause-effect relationships that will tell policymakers and practitioners, with 
any degree of certainty, what will work in a particular place and at a particular time.  If our 
community continues to makes such promises, it may temporarily improve what the authors of 
Scientific Research in Education claim (not without justification) is the field’s bad reputation within 
policymaker and practitioner communities. Unfortunately, cynicism about our field almost certainly 
will be even greater when even scientific educational researchers fail to do the impossible and 
policymakers and practitioners still find themselves “waiting for Godot.”  
So, What’s a Field Like Educational Research to Do? 
Educational researchers, then, would seem to be between the perennial rock and hard place 
when it comes to their relationship with the policy and practice communities. Policymakers and 
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practitioners expect educational researchers to tell them “what works,” yet researchers cannot really 
do this, at least not in the way and not to the degree that policymakers expect. Obviously, 
qualitatively oriented educational researchers can only document what appeared to have worked in a 
particular case or small number of cases and provide “working hypotheses” about what might work 
elsewhere (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). But even quantitative researchers focused on producing the so-
called “scientific” theories touted by the authors of Scientific Research in Education also will not succeed 
in playing the what-works game (National Research Council, 2002). Even if contemporary 
researchers could somehow generate theories that factored in all relevant individual differences and 
contextual contingencies—something Cronbach concluded was impossible to do—they would be 
left with theories that are too baroque and complex for policymakers and practitioners to use to 
guide their decision making.  
Clearly, if the research community wants to avoid making promises it cannot fulfill—and if it 
wants to avoid engaging in more grand methodological debates in the future that obscure more than 
they reveal—there is a need to re-conceptualize the notion of inquiry for a field like Education. The 
work of Joseph Schwab (1969, 1971, 1973) and, in particular, his notion of the practical provides a 
roadmap, of sorts, for this reconceptualization process.  
Revisiting Schwab’s Notion of “The Practical” 
Schwab on Theory  
When Schwab, in 1969, declared the curriculum field moribund, he attributed the curriculum 
field’s moribund state to its “reliance on theory in an area where theory is partly inappropriate” (p. 
1). His argument, which was developed further in two follow-up articles published in 1971 and 1973, 
was similar to the argument about the limits of theory that was just presented, though he added a 
few physical science examples to help make his point. “The constantly accelerating body of classical 
mechanics,” Schwab wrote in 1969, “was the acceleration of a body in ‘free’ fall, fall in a perfect 
vacuum, and the general or theoretical rule formulated in classical mechanics is far from describing 
the fall of actual bodies in actual mediums” (p.11). Schwab (1969) also noted that 
The rule that light varies inversely as the square of the distance holds exactly only for 
an imaginary point source of light. For real light sources of increasing expanse, the 
so-called law holds more and more approximately, and for very large sources it 
affords little or no useable information. (p. 11)  
After providing examples from the physical sciences, Schwab noted: “What is true of the best of 
theories in the simplest sciences is true a fortiori in the social sciences” (p. 11). Schwab went on to 
explain why theoretical approximations are much more problematic in the social and behavioral 
sciences than they are in the physical sciences. The social and behavioral sciences, Schwab 
contended,   
are marked by the coexistence of competing theories. There is not one theory of 
personality but twenty, representing at least six radically different choices of what is 
relevant and important in human behavior. There is not one theory of groups but 
several. There is not one theory of learning but half a dozen. All the social and 
behavioral sciences are marked by “schools,” each distinguished by a different choice 
of principle of enquiry, each of which selects from the intimidating complexities of 
the subject matter the small fraction of the whole with which it can deal. (p. 13) 
In short, implicit within different theories in the behavioral and social sciences are different a priori 
frames that determine what counts (and what gets counted). Behavioral and social science theories, 
in other words, are not just empirical. They also implicitly endorse particular ways of viewing the 
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world and, in the process, value certain things over other things. Furthermore, we cannot conduct a 
critical experiment or, even, a series of critical experiments to determine which of a number of rival 
theories is correct because rival theories are framed in different ways and do not employ a common 
language. As a consequence, rival theories also implicitly endorse different criteria for assessing a 
theory’s relative worth.  
Schwab went on to propose an alternative to what he believed was the curriculum field’s 
inappropriate fixation on theory. Could the alternative Schwab proposed for the curriculum field 
years ago be applied to the field of educational research today? That is the question I want to 
consider here.  
Schwab’s Alternative 
Schwab’s (1969) alternative entailed being eclectic and refocusing scholarly attention “from 
the theoretic to the practical. By eclectic,” Schwab wrote,  
I mean the arts by which unsystematic, uneasy, but usable focus on a body of 
problems is effected among diverse theories, each relevant to the problems in a 
different way. By the “practical” I do not mean the curbstone practicality of the 
mediocre administrator and the man on the street, for whom the practical means the 
easily achieved, familiar goals which can be reached by familiar means. I refer, rather, 
to a complex discipline, relatively unfamiliar to the academic and differing radically 
from the disciplines of the theoretic.  (p. 1) 
Schwab, here, is invoking a distinction that dates back to Aristotle. In Aristotelian terms, theory is 
about knowledge; the practical is about choice and action. Theory provides truth (which, in modern 
life, is determined empirically, albeit relative to the a priori frame that was employed to generate 
empirical findings); the practical is oriented toward making defensible decisions. 
What Schwab (1969) means by the practical can probably be best understood by focusing on 
the method he recommends using to make defensible decisions about choice and action. Schwab 
refers to that method as deliberation and notes that  
deliberation is complex and arduous. It treats both ends and means and must treat 
them as mutually determining one another. It must try to identify, with respect to 
both, what facts may be relevant. It must try to ascertain the relevant facts in the 
concrete case. It must try to identify the desiderata in the case. It must generate 
alternative solutions. It must make every effort to trace the branching pathways of 
consequences which may flow from each alternative and affect desiderata. It must 
then weigh alternatives and their costs and consequences against one another and 
choose, not the right alternative, for there is no such thing, but the best one. (pp. 20-
21, emphasis in original) 
An example of deliberation. Schwab did not provide even a hypothetical example of 
deliberation in the real world, but philosopher of science Stephen Toulmin (1972) did. Toulmin 
provided his hypothetical example in the process of distinguishing between what happens in 
academic disciplines that are held together by a shared (but also limited) purpose and, consequently, 
a shared theoretical perspective, on the one hand, and public policy fields where different, and often 
conflicting, purposes come into play on a regular basis, on the other.  
Toulmin (1972) noted that a group of engineers would likely agree on the optimal place for a 
community to build a dam in a particular area of the country precisely because they more than likely 
employ a shared theoretical framework. That is not, necessarily, where a board of community 
representatives charged with making policy decisions will decide to build the dam, however. The 
board cannot opt to build the dam where the engineers tell them it will collapse, of course, but 
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before they decide on their optimal location, the board will want to consider and weigh a range of 
perspectives and criteria.  
For example, board members undoubtedly would want to consider the community 
disruption that building a dam in certain places would cause and the price the community (or at least 
certain segments of the community) would pay in terms of social cohesion. They also, undoubtedly, 
would want to consider and factor into their decision cost. And, if the community representatives 
are elected representatives, they also almost certainly would want to weigh the impact of any decision 
the board makes on their re-election prospects. To adequately address some concerns, they may 
even want to consult with experts other than engineers, i.e. experts who view the world through 
different theoretical frames than the theoretical frame used by engineers. To the extent that the final 
decision was made intellectually through discussion and debate, rather than through the exercise of 
brute power, the community representatives would have engaged in at least a reasonable facsimile of 
what Schwab calls deliberation.  
Other aspects of “the practical.” There are a number of other aspects to Schwab’s (1969) 
“complex discipline, relatively unfamiliar to the academic and differing radically from the disciplines 
of the theoretic” (p. 1). Schwab emphasizes, for example, that the practical is about incremental 
change and that the changes that are made must be carefully planned and so consciously coordinated 
“with what remains unchanged that the functioning of the whole remain coherent and unimpaired” 
(p.14).  
Furthermore, the impetus for change is “identified frictions and failures” (Schwab, 1969, p. 
16), not, as is so often the case today, some new theory, either from academia, the popular press, the 
growing cadre of professional reformers attempting to sell their wares to schools, or some 
combination of these sources of reform ideas. “Theory,” Schwab wrote,  
by being concerned with new things to do, is unconcerned with the successes and 
failures of present doings. Hence present failures, unless they coincide with what is 
repaired by the proposed innovations, go unnoticed—as do present successes. The 
practical, on the other hand, is directly and deliberately concerned with the diagnosis 
of ills. (pp. 16-17) 
Undoubtedly, the thoughtful and student-oriented school counselor who complained, during my 
interview with him a few years ago, about his school district’s propensity to promote “reforms du 
jour” would applaud at least this aspect of Schwab’s notion of the practical. I suspect other 
counselors, teachers, and administrators in other districts with a propensity to embrace theoretically 
driven reforms in a seemingly mindless search of some sort of educational salvation also would join 
in the applause.  
Summary. There are a number of other aspects to Schwab’s conception of the practical that 
cannot be detailed here due to space considerations. Hopefully, enough has been said for readers to 
at least glimpse what the field of educational research would look like if it were reoriented around 
Schwab’s notion of the practical and his method of deliberation.  
If this would happen, for example, the sort of theory that so interested the authors of 
Scientific Research in Education would still matter, but it would no longer be expected to provide 
policymakers and practitioners definitive answers to their what-works question, something no 
theory, no matter how scientific it might be, can do. Theory would now function as a tool within the 
deliberation process about what to do about specific problems in specific situations. In that process, 
a number of theories reflecting a number of different concerns could provide a number of specific 
ways to frame the problem under consideration (Weiss, 1991). Theories also could suggest what 
possibly would happen if certain decisions were made and certain actions taken.  
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There also would also be plenty for qualitative and mixed-methods researchers interested in 
contributing to the deliberation process to do. Their work can provide frames for focusing 
deliberation, but there is also another role that qualitative researchers, in particular, can play. Schwab 
noted that deliberation needs to address specific problems, as well as consider what proposed 
solutions would do to existing ways of doing business in schools. To do these things, those engaged 
in deliberation must have a reasonably close-up sense of what is happening in the contexts that their 
deliberation is focusing on. Schwab commented back in 1969 about how little was actually known 
about how certain subjects of the curriculum were actually taught. My experiences doing research in 
schools and helping teachers and administrators study what is happening in their classrooms and in 
the school and district outside their classrooms suggests that this is still the case for many, if not all, 
aspects of schooling.  
For example, one of my colleagues recently talked with the associate superintendent in an 
urban school district about a Mexican-American high school student who was scheduled to repeat a 
course he had taken the previous year. Because he had already passed the course, any credits he 
would accrue by taking the course a second time would be useless in accumulating the number of 
credits required for him to become the first member of his extended family to graduate from high 
school. The assistant superintendent seemed truly mystified. “He should not be repeating a course 
he already took; how in the world did this happen?” the associate superintendent asked. My 
colleague and I, however, had been doing qualitative and mixed-methods research in this district for 
years and had seen a surprisingly large number of scheduling problems similar to this one in high 
schools throughout the district. Before the assistant superintendent and others (including members 
of the research community) could productively deliberate about how to improve the district’s 
painfully high dropout rate, especially among Mexican-Americans, they would need specific 
information about this and other problems. Qualitative researchers are able to provide this sort of 
descriptive information, and mixed-methods designs can be used to assess how widespread this and 
other identified problems are.   
So, there is still a role for traditional qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-methods researchers 
to play if educational inquiry is re-oriented around the notion of deliberation. It is also the case, 
however, that traditional researchers of all methodological stripes would play a less central role than 
they (and, also, policymakers and practitioners) currently envision researchers playing. Their role 
would no longer be to tell policymakers and practitioners “what works” and, consequently, what to 
do. Rather, their role would be to provide input into a process of deliberation.  
Conceivably, researchers could sometimes lead deliberation processes, but such work is quite 
different and requires a different skill set than the work associated with—and skill set required to 
do—traditional forms of quantitative, qualitative, and/or mixed-methods research. The skill set is 
undoubtedly closer to a the skill set needed by a counselor engaged in group therapy than the skill 
set required to do traditional social science research, but even the counselor analogy is inadequate 
because group therapy normally is not oriented toward arriving at a group decision about what sort 
of collective action to pursue.  
Undoubtedly many researchers will opt not to engage in the sort of retraining required to 
play a different role than the researcher role they currently play, and those that resist playing a new 
role and continue to do what they have always done may find it difficult to play more of a 
supporting role in educational decision making than the lead role assigned to researchers in the 
what-works plotline. Difficult as all of this might be, however, re-orienting the field of educational 
inquiry around Schwab’s notion of “the practical” and the process of deliberation that is the 
fundamental methodology of “the practical” seems preferable to perpetuating the illusion that 
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educational research can do what educational research will never be able to do, no matter how 
“scientific” it becomes.  
Caveats 
I would be remiss if, before concluding this paper, I did not at least acknowledge a number 
of caveats with respect to the proposal to reorient the educational research field around Schwab’s 
notion of “the practical.” Four caveats will be discussed here.  
Caveat #1. First, I need to acknowledge that the curriculum field never followed Schwab’s 
lead away from the theoretical and toward Schwab’s conception of the practical. The so-called 
curriculum reconceptualists who became influential in Curriculum Studies soon after Schwab 
articulated his conception of “the practical” (See, for example, Pinar, 1975), in fact, embraced the 
theoretical with a vengeance. To be sure, the theory they embraced was European social theory and 
not the sort of theory rooted in systematic empirical research touted by the authors of Scientific 
Research in Education. Nevertheless, the reconceptualists in Curriculum Studies consciously accelerated 
what Schwab saw as a problematic “flight from the subject of the field” (Schwab, 1969, p. 3) by 
refocusing the field’s attention on theorizing (about either macro societal force or one’s highly 
personal experiences) and explicitly away from ameliorating specific practical problems within 
schools and similar sorts of organizations.  
Caveat #2. Even if Schwab’s ideas had been embraced by the curriculum studies field, it is 
unlikely the thinking that emerged from Curriculum Studies would be appealing to many advocates 
of scientific research in education. If my conversations with science-in-education partisans are at all 
representative, the push for scientific research in education was motivated as much by “physics 
envy” as by anything else. More often than not, scientific-research-in-education partisans appear 
desperate to achieve the sort of status that the academy gives to economists; most would even settle 
for the respect that sociologists receive. A deliberation-oriented conception of the field of 
educational inquiry adapted from a relatively low status field like Curriculum Studies, therefore, is 
not likely to generate much enthusiasm in certain circles of the educational research community. 
The good news, however, is that there is at least one high-status field that is built around the 
notion of a specialized form or reasoning and decision making. That is the field of law (Levi, 1948).  
In a recent paper, for example, University of Virginia law professors Spellman & Schauer (2012) 
wrote:   
In the 1973 film The Paper Chase, the iconic Professor Kingsfield announced to his 
class of first year law students: “you teach yourself the law. I train your minds. You 
come in here with a skull full of mush, and if you survive, you’ll leave thinking like a 
lawyer.” In claiming to teach students to think like lawyers, Kingsfield echoed the 
assumptions of centuries of legal ideology. In the seventeenth century, the great 
English judge Edward Coke glorified the “artificial reason” of the law…, and from 
then until now lawyers and judges have believed that legal thinking and reasoning is 
different from ordinary thinking and reasoning, even from very good ordinary 
thinking and reasoning. Moreover, the difference, as Kingsfield emphasized, has long 
been thought to be one of process and not simply of content. It is not only that 
those with legal training know legal rules that laypeople do not. Rather, lawyers and 
judges are believed, at least by lawyers and judges, to employ techniques of 
argument, reasoning, and decision making that diverge from those of even expert 
non-lawyer reasoners and decision makers. (p.3) 
The claim that legal reasoning is fundamentally different from the sort of reasoning engaged in by 
ordinary individuals outside of legal contexts has been challenged (see, for example, Schlegel, 1980), 
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of course. That debate within the field of law is not important here, however. The relevant point 
here is that there is a high-status field within the academy that is built around what is at least 
believed to be a specialized form of thinking and decision making; consequently, there is at least one 
high-status precedent for focusing the field of educational research around a process like 
deliberation.  
Caveat #3. The law analogy, however, suggests a third caveat: While the field of law has a 
variety of legal forums that serve as venues for, and help structure, the process of legal reasoning, 
there are few comparable forums in the educational research field to structure the process of 
deliberation. Schwab, in his 1969 paper, in fact, called for  
the establishment of new journals, and education of educators so that they can write 
for them and read them. The journals will be forums where possible problems of 
curriculum will be broached from many sources and heir possible importance 
debated from many points of view. They will be the stage for display of anticipatory 
solutions to problems, from a similar variety of sources. They will constitute 
deliberative assemblies in which problems and alternative solutions will be argued by 
representatives of all for the consideration of all and for the shaping of intelligent 
consensus. (p. 21)  
The sorts of journals that Schwab envisioned back in 1969 have not been created even in the 
curriculum field, much less in the field of education, more generally. And even if they had been, 
Schwab noted that “such journals [would]…not [be] sufficient. They stand as only one concrete 
model of the kind of forum which is required” (p. 21).   
Early in my career I did experiment with another kind of forum. I built an evaluation design 
around the notion of deliberation and received my first grant from the federal government to 
systematically study what happened when the model was implemented in an elementary school to 
evaluate the school’s language arts program (Donmoyer, 1991). The model entailed assembling a 
stakeholder forum composed of some of the school’s teachers and its principal; representatives of 
the school’s parents, some of whom were supportive and some of whom were critical of the current 
program; and a representative from the district office that had been advocating curriculum and 
teaching strategies that were, to some extent, at least, antithetical to the practices employed in the 
school. Forum members explored a number of ways to frame the issues, and considered a wide array 
of evidence, including not only the school’s standardized test scores but also the actual tests that 
generated the scores to determine whether the tests matched forum members’ definitions of reading.  
They also generated evidence by using a process that the model referred to as joint observation; 
joint observation entailed having two forum members who had decidedly different perspectives of 
the program being evaluated watch the same segment of teaching and, then, collaboratively attempt 
write a description and an assessment of what had been observed. At the end of the process, forum 
members attempted to reach consensus on a series of recommendations about the program.  
The process turned out to be more difficult to implement than I had envisioned (it lived up 
to Schwab’s claim that “deliberation is complex and arduous” (p. 21)), but it also produced results 
that were both interesting and promising (see Donmoyer, 1991).  However, because I was an 
untenured assistant professor at the time and realized that Schwab’s thinking was not being 
embraced by the curriculum or any other field, I opted not to continue to explore the evaluation-as-
deliberation notion after this initial foray and, instead, conducted more conventional research studies 
using qualitative methods that had begun to be accepted in the field.  In retrospect, I regret this 
decision, however much it might have made sense in terms of career-building. If I had further 
developed and experimented with a deliberation approach to evaluation, our field might have had at 
least one reasonably well established forum in which to engage in the deliberation process.  
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More recently, I was exposed to another process that, while not precisely what Schwab 
meant when he talked about deliberation, had some of the elements of a deliberative process and, 
consequently, might be adapted to deliberations about how to resolve specific problems in 
education. That process was the talking circle process used by some Indigenous culture.  
In Indigenous cultures, talking circles are used for a variety of purposes, everything from 
problem solving to healing. The process, as its name suggests, generally entails having participants sit 
in a circle. One person begins to speak, and when he or she is finished speaking, another person 
begins speaking. Each person can speak for as long as he or she wants. When it is his or her turn to 
speak, each person is free to comment on what another member of the circle has said, or the new 
speaker can introduce a new topic. The task of the other circle members is to listen carefully to what 
other members of the circle are saying. The assumption is that every member of the circle has 
something valuable to offer the group and, consequently, group members must attend to what is 
being said by everyone. When each person, in turn, has spoken, the process begins again. The 
process ends when circle members have nothing more to say.  
The talking circles in which I participated were organized by members of the Cree Nation on 
a Reserve in Canada. I was involved because one of my doctoral students wanted to study thinking 
about leadership and leadership practices in an Indigenous views culture. Gaining access was more 
difficult than even I anticipated, and my Ph.D. student and I participated in a number of talking 
circles, some of which were about access questions and some of which were on other topics. After 
the dissertation was completed, the student, a key informant from the Indigenous culture, and I 
wrote a paper presented at the 2012 meeting of the American Educational Research Association in 
which reflected on the access experience and what it meant for Western researchers who wanted to 
study Indigenous cultures (Buchanan, Makokis, & Donmoyer, 2012). We attempted to use the 
talking circle idea in writing the paper. Each of us wrote an entry and then passed it on to the other 
two members of the circle. The next two circle participants did the same, in turn, and we continued 
around the circle until none of us had anything to add.  
Let me state again, a talking circle process is not precisely the same thing as Schwab’s notion 
of deliberation. But to the extent that it articulates a wide range of perspectives from different sorts 
of individuals, it may be helpful to incorporate talking circle procedures into a deliberative process.  
The two examples I have gleaned from work during the early and later years of my own career 
hopefully will help readers get at least a glimpse of what forums in which deliberation might occur 
could look like. Of course, the fact that I had to rely on somewhat ancillary examples from my 
personal research agenda to illustrate the types of forums that will need to be developed in our field 
also suggests the monumental task that must be accomplished if the educational research field is to 
be re-oriented around the practice of what Schwab (1969) called deliberation.  
Caveat #4. A final caveat can be articulated as a question: Will participants in a deliberation 
process today and in the foreseeable future be willing—or even able—to engage in deliberation 
processes that are invariably “complex and arduous” (Schwab, 1969, p.3)? We live, after all, in an era 
when people are accustomed to digesting argumentation that takes only 140 characters to articulate 
and an era when Fox News and MSNBC provide news programming to feed rather than challenge a 
priori assumptions and biases. Will people who now expect relatively simple and unqualified 
knowledge about “what works” in schools be able to sustain interest in a deliberative process that 
inevitably will require an appreciation of the complexity of educational issues and the need for many 
qualifications and caveats? I must admit, I do not know the answer to this question, but I fear what 
the answer might be.  
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Conclusion 
Here I have suggested that thinking that Joseph Schwab (1969, 1971, 1973) articulated more 
than four decades ago may provide a way to reorient the educational research field so that it can 
respond to the concerns and expectations of policymakers and practitioners without making 
promises that the educational research process can never fulfill. Is re-orienting the field around 
Schwab’s notion of “the practical” and the process of deliberation a viable idea? Given the caveats 
articulated in the prior section, I must admit that the answer to this question is hardly obvious. 
Indeed, some of the caveats might even suggest that there is a rather glaring contradiction in this 
paper’s argument: Schwab, after all, argued for incremental rather than dramatic change. Although 
the deliberation-based conception of educational articulated here still has a role for both traditional 
quantitative and qualitative research to play, as well as a place for the theories touted by the authors 
of Scientific Research in Education, it also recasts traditional forms of research and traditional research 
products in a secondary and supporting role. One could argue that a change that requires at least 
some researchers to acquire entirely new skill sets and expects everyone to rethink what educational 
research can and cannot do is hardly incremental.  
On the other hand, educational research is hardly a well-established fixture in policymaking 
and practice-oriented decision making processes, and it seems downright foolhardy for members of 
our field, in an effort to acquire a modicum of influence, at least temporarily, to make promises that 
even the sort of scientific research in education touted by the authors of Scientific Research in Education 
(National Research Council, 2002) cannot conceivably fulfill. Such unfulfilled promise will eventually 
create even more cynicism about educational research and educational researchers than already exists 
among policymakers and practitioners.  
Furthermore, it also seems foolhardy for schools to continue to embrace theory-based 
reforms du jour that all too often contribute to rather than solve problems. Finally, it would be truly 
unfortunate for educational researchers to engage in yet another round of methodological warfare 
that sidesteps or camouflages the bottom-line question about how educational research can actually 
contribute to decision making about educational policy and practice. Joseph Schwab at least offers 
an alternative; the only question is how implementable that alternative really is.    
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